Why al qaeda attacked 9 11

The Director of Central Intelligence, policymakers, and military officials expressed frustration with the lack of actionable intelligence. Some officials inside the Pentagon, including those in the special forces and the counterterrorism policy office, also expressed frustration with the lack of military action.

The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response to this new challenge. Many dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats.

Yet, while there were many reports on Bin Laden and his growing al Qaeda organization, there was no comprehensive review of what the intelligence community knew and what it did not know, and what that meant.

But there were limits to what the CIA was able to achieve by disrupting terrorist activities abroad and by using proxies to try to capture Bin Ladin and his lieutenants in Afghanistan. CIA officers were aware of those limitations. To put it simply, covert action was not a silver bullet. It was important to engage proxies in Afghanistan and to build various capabilities so that if an opportunity presented itself, the CIA could act on it. But for more than three years, through both the late Clinton and early Bush administrations, the CIA relied on proxy forces, and there was growing frustration within the CIA's Counterterrorist Center and in the National Security Council staff with the lack of results.

The development of the Predator and the push to aid the Northern Alliance were products of this frustration. Throughout the s, the FBI's counterterrorism efforts against international terrorist organizations included both intelligence and criminal investigations.

The FBI's approach to investigations was case-specific, decentralized, and geared toward prosecution. Significant FBI resources were devoted to after-the-fact investigations of major terrorist attacks, resulting in several prosecutions.

The FBI attempted several reform efforts aimed at strengthening its ability to prevent such attacks, but these reform efforts failed to implement organization-wide institutional change. On September 11, , the FBI was limited in several areas critical to an effective preventive counterterrorism strategy. Those working counterterrorism matters did so despite limited intelligence collection and strategic analysis capabilities, a limited capacity to share information both internally and externally, insufficient training, perceived legal barriers to sharing information, and inadequate resources.

Permeable Borders and Immigration Controls There were opportunities for intelligence and law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda's travel vulnerabilities. Neither the State Department's consular officers nor the Immigration and Naturalization Service's inspectors and agents were ever considered full partners in a national counterterrorism effort. Permeable Aviation Security Hijackers studied publicly available materials on the aviation security system and used items that had less metal content than a handgun and were most likely permissible.

Though two of the hijackers were on the U. The hijackers had to beat only one layer of security-the security checkpoint process. Even though several hijackers were selected for extra screening by the CAPPS system, this led only to greater scrutiny of their checked baggage.

Once on board, the hijackers were faced with aircraft personnel who were trained to be nonconfrontational in the event of a hijacking. Additional expenses included travel to obtain passports and visas, travel to the United States, expenses incurred by the plot leader and facilitators outside the United States, and expenses incurred by the people selected to be hijackers who ultimately did not participate.

The conspiracy made extensive use of banks in the United States. The hijackers opened accounts in their own names, using passports and other identification documents.

Their transactions were unremarkable and essentially invisible amid the billions of dollars flowing around the world every day. If a particular source of funds had dried up, al Qaeda could easily have found enough money elsewhere to fund the attack.

Given that lack of preparedness, they attempted and failed to improvise an effective homeland defense against an unprecedented challenge. The events of that morning do not reflect discredit on operational personnel. NORAD's Northeast Air Defense Sector personnel reached out for information and made the best judgments they could based on the information they received.

Individual FAA controllers, facility managers, and command center managers were creative and agile in recommending a nationwide alert, ground-stopping local traffic, ordering all aircraft nationwide to land, and executing that unprecedented order flawlessly. At more senior levels, communication was poor. Senior military and FAA leaders had no effective communication with each other. The chain of command did not function well. The President could not reach some senior officials.

The Secretary of Defense did not enter the chain of command until the morning's key events were over. Their actions saved lives and inspired a nation. Effective decisionmaking in New York was hampered by problems in command and control and in internal communications. Within the Fire Department of New York, this was true for several reasons: the magnitude of the incident was unforeseen; commanders had difficulty communicating with their units; more units were actually dispatched than were ordered by the chiefs; some units self-dispatched; and once units arrived at the World Trade Center, they were neither comprehensively accounted for nor coordinated.

The Port Authority's response was hampered by the lack both of standard operating procedures and of radios capable of enabling multiple commands to respond to an incident in unified fashion. Congress The Congress, like the executive branch, responded slowly to the rise of transnational terrorism as a threat to national security. The legislative branch adjusted little and did not restructure itself to address changing threats.

Its attention to terrorism was episodic and splintered across several committees. So long as oversight is undermined by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and leadership.

Are We Safer? Yet terrorist attacks continue. Even as we have thwarted attacks, nearly everyone expects they will come. How can this be? The problem is that al Qaeda represents an ideological movement, not a finite group of people. It initiates and inspires, even if it no longer directs. In this way it has transformed itself into a decentralized force.

Bin Ladin may be limited in his ability to organize major attacks from his hideouts. Yet killing or capturing him, while extremely important, would not end terror. His message of inspiration to a new generation of terrorists would continue. But we are not safe. We therefore make the following recommendations that we believe can make America safer and more secure. We divide our recommendations into two basic parts: What to do, and how to do it.

The enemy is not Islam, the great world faith, but a perversion of Islam. The enemy goes beyond al Qaeda to include the radical ideological movement, inspired in part by al Qaeda, that has spawned other terrorist groups and violence.

Thus our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the al Qaeda network and, in the long term, prevailing over the ideology that contributes to Islamist terrorism. This work continues. But long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and weaken our national effort.

What should Americans expect from their government? The goal seems unlimited: Defeat terrorism anywhere in the world. But Americans have also been told to expect the worst: An attack is probably coming; it may be more devastating still.

Vague goals match an amorphous picture of the enemy. Al Qaeda and other groups are popularly described as being all over the world, adaptable, resilient, needing little higher-level organization, and capable of anything. It is an image of an omnipotent hydra of destruction. That image lowers expectations of government effectiveness. It lowers them too far. Our report shows a determined and capable group of plotters. Yet the group was fragile and occasionally left vulnerable by the marginal, unstable people often attracted to such causes.

The enemy made mistakes. But the American people are entitled to expect that officials will have realistic objectives, clear guidance, and effective organization. They are entitled to see standards for performance so they can judge, with the help of their elected representatives, whether the objectives are being met.

We propose a strategy with three dimensions: 1 attack terrorists and their organizations, 2 prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism, and 3 protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks. Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations Root out sanctuaries. Strengthen long-term U. Confront problems with Saudi Arabia in the open and build a relationship beyond oil, a relationship that both sides can defend to their citizens and includes a shared commitment to reform.

Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism In October , Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld asked if enough was being done "to fashion a broad integrated plan to stop the next generation of terrorists. To Muslim parents, terrorists like Bin Ladin have nothing to offer their children but visions of violence and death.

America and its friends have the advantage-our vision can offer a better future. Where Muslim governments, even those who are friends, do not offer opportunity, respect the rule of law, or tolerate differences, then the United States needs to stand for a better future. Communicate and defend American ideals in the Islamic world, through much stronger public diplomacy to reach more people, including students and leaders outside of government.

Our efforts here should be as strong as they were in combating closed societies during the Cold War. Offer an agenda of opportunity that includes support for public education and economic openness. Develop a comprehensive coalition strategy against Islamist terrorism, using a flexible contact group of leading coalition governments and fashioning a common coalition approach on issues like the treatment of captured terrorists.

Devote a maximum effort to the parallel task of countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Expect less from trying to dry up terrorist money and more from following the money for intelligence, as a tool to hunt terrorists, understand their networks, and disrupt their operations. Address problems of screening people with biometric identifiers across agencies and governments, including our border and transportation systems, by designing a comprehensive screening system that addresses common problems and sets common standards.

As standards spread, this necessary and ambitious effort could dramatically strengthen the world's ability to intercept individuals who could pose catastrophic threats. Quickly complete a biometric entry-exit screening system, one that also speeds qualified travelers. Set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as driver's licenses.

Develop strategies for neglected parts of our transportation security system. In aviation, prevent arguments about a new computerized profiling system from delaying vital improvements in the "no-fly" and "automatic selectee" lists. Also, give priority to the improvement of checkpoint screening. Determine, with leadership from the President, guidelines for gathering and sharing information in the new security systems that are needed, guidelines that integrate safeguards for privacy and other essential liberties.

Underscore that as government power necessarily expands in certain ways, the burden of retaining such powers remains on the executive to demonstrate the value of such powers and ensure adequate supervision of how they are used, including a new board to oversee the implementation of the guidelines needed for gathering and sharing information in these new security systems.

Base federal funding for emergency preparedness solely on risks and vulnerabilities, putting New York City and Washington, D. Such assistance should not remain a program for general revenue sharing or pork-barrel spending. Make homeland security funding contingent on the adoption of an incident command system to strengthen teamwork in a crisis, including a regional approach. Allocate more radio spectrum and improve connectivity for public safety communications, and encourage widespread adoption of newly developed standards for private-sector emergency preparedness-since the private sector controls 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure.

To implement it will require a government better organized than the one that exists today, with its national security institutions designed half a century ago to win the Cold War. Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system created a generation ago for a world that no longer exists.

Our detailed recommendations are designed to fit together. Their purpose is clear: to build unity of effort across the U.

As one official now serving on the front lines overseas put it to us: "One fight, one team. The effort of fighting terrorism has flooded over many of the usual agency boundaries because of its sheer quantity and energy. Attitudes have changed. Alternatively, some experts on Islamic terrorism argue that the clash is actually within Islam itself between so-called moderates and extreme fundamentalists who support a global jihad "holy war".

In contrast, the Iraq war triggered huge demonstrations across the Islamic world and led to calls by leading clerics for a defensive jihad against U. The war in Iraq has been a "total disaster" for the war on terrorism: Bin Laden now eclipses President Bush in popularity in Pakistan; recent elections have registered significant gains for Islamist parties; and the number of terrorist attacks globally is the highest since Meanwhile, Osama bin Laden remains at large and continues to prolifically generate videotaped messages, which are intended to energize his base and to provide direct instruction to his supporters.

For example, bin Laden videos have been linked to two subsequent assassination attempts on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. As to efforts to apprehend him, Bergen was sympathetic to the difficulty of finding one man in a huge geographical area.

The conventional wisdom is that bin Laden is hiding in the barren, no-man's land along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Another possibility, given the close operational links between Al Qaeda and Kashmiri insurgents, is that he is in the disputed region separating Pakistan and India.

Osama bin Laden is not "making amateur errors," but will eventually be located — although Bergen, taking the Al Qaeda leader at his word, believes that he will not be captured alive, preferring instead to go down fighting as a martyr. Bergen believes the principal near-term WMD threat is a radiological weapon, or so-called "dirty bomb.

In his videos, bin Laden continues to emphasize his strong intention for Al Qaeda to disrupt the global economy. Bin Laden's capture or killing would probably trigger major anti-American demonstrations in the Islamic world.

Even if possibly enhancing the appeal of bin Laden's ideas over the long run, his removal would certainly set back Al Qaeda operationally. Bergen emphasized the need for the United States and the West to wage an effective war of ideas against bin Laden's jihadist ideology, just as they did against communism during the Cold War.

All told, military personnel and civilians were killed in the Pentagon, along with all 64 people aboard the airliner. Less than 15 minutes after the terrorists struck the nerve center of the U. The structural steel of the skyscraper, built to withstand winds in excess of miles per hour and a large conventional fire, could not withstand the tremendous heat generated by the burning jet fuel. At a. Only six people in the World Trade Center towers at the time of their collapse survived.

Almost 10, others were treated for injuries, many severe. Because the plane had been delayed in taking off, passengers on board learned of events in New York and Washington via cell phone and Airfone calls to the ground.

Knowing that the aircraft was not returning to an airport as the hijackers claimed, a group of passengers and flight attendants planned an insurrection.

One of the passengers, Thomas Burnett, Jr. I love you, honey. Sandy Bradshaw, a flight attendant, called her husband and explained that she had slipped into a galley and was filling pitchers with boiling water.

The passengers fought the four hijackers and are suspected to have attacked the cockpit with a fire extinguisher.

The plane then flipped over and sped toward the ground at upwards of miles per hour, crashing in a rural field near Shanksville in western Pennsylvania at a. All 44 people aboard were killed. Its intended target is not known, but theories include the White House , the U. Capitol, the Camp David presidential retreat in Maryland or one of several nuclear power plants along the eastern seaboard. Citizens of 78 countries died in New York, Washington, D.

At the World Trade Center, 2, died after the two planes slammed into the twin towers. That figure includes firefighters and paramedics, 23 New York City police officers and 37 Port Authority police officers who were struggling to complete an evacuation of the buildings and save the office workers trapped on higher floors. At the Pentagon, people were killed, including 64 on American Airlines Flight 77, the airliner that struck the building.

On Flight 93 , 44 people died when the plane crash-landed in Pennsylvania. Bush , who was in Florida at the time of the attacks and had spent the day being shuttled around the country because of security concerns, returned to the White House. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve. In a reference to the eventual U. Within two months, U. Osama bin Laden, the mastermind behind the September 11th attacks, remained at large until May 2, , when he was finally tracked down and killed by U.

In June , then-President Barack Obama announced the beginning of large-scale troop withdrawals from Afghanistan; it took until August for all U. It was signed into law by President George W.